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ABSTRACT
Vulnerability exploitation is reportedly one of the main aack vec-
tors against computer systems. Yet, most vulnerabilities remain
unexploited by aackers. It is therefore of central importance to
identify vulnerabilities that carry a high ‘potential for aack’. In
this paper we rely on Symantec data on real aacks detected in
the wild to identify a trade-o in the Impact and Complexity of
a vulnerability, in terms of aacks that it generates; exploiting
this eect, we devise a readily computable estimator of the vul-
nerability’s Aack Potential that reliably estimates the expected
volume of aacks against the vulnerability. We evaluate our estima-
tor performance against standard patching policies by measuring
foiled aacks and demanded workload expressed as the number
of vulnerabilities entailed to patch. We show that our estimator
signicantly improves over standard patching policies by ruling
out low-risk vulnerabilities, while maintaining invariant levels of
coverage against aacks in the wild. Our estimator can be used as
a rst aid for vulnerability prioritisation to focus assessment eorts
on high-potential vulnerabilities.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy→ Vulnerability management;
KEYWORDS
Vulnerability, CVSS, exploitation, aack potential, prioritization
ACM Reference format:
Luca Allodi and Fabio Massacci. 2017. Aack Potential in Impact and
Complexity . In Proceedings of ARES ’17, Reggio Calabria, Italy, August
29-September 01, 2017, 7 pages.
DOI: 10.1145/3098954.3098965
1 INTRODUCTION
e identication of objective and readily available measures for
vulnerability risk is a central part of the vulnerability mitigation
process [13, 15, 16]. Industry standards such as the Common Vul-
nerability Scoring System (CVSS) have been developed to create a
common framework over which evaluate vulnerability severity and
guide the vulnerability mitigation process [15]; a CVSS assessment
produces two nal components:
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1) e CVSS-vector, that contains the ne-grained information
regarding the characteristics of the vulnerability. Among other
values, the CVSS-vector provides information on the complexity of
the vulnerability exploitation (in the metric Access Complexity),
and its impact on the aacked system.
2) e CVSS-score, a nal severity score that synthesises the
information in the CVSS-vector in a single value between 0 and
10 (less severe to more severe).
e CVSS-score is widely used as a metric for vulnerability man-
agement; for example, PCI-DSS, the worldwide security standard
for systems handling credit-card data, sets a ‘hard threshold’ for
vulnerability patching at a CVSS score greater or equal to 4 (10
being the maximum) [13]. Similarly, NIST’s SCAP standard uses the
CVSS-score as the metric of reference for vulnerability assessment
across industry sectors, including consumer systems [14].
Unfortunately, recent studies show that the CVSS-score does
not correlate well with aacks in the wild, leading to sub-optimal
vulnerability management policies [2, 6, 16]. is is particularly un-
fortunate as the CVSS score gives a clear, well-dened and readily
available assessment of the vulnerability that can be used ‘out-of-
the-box’ to take a rst security decision on whether the vulnerabil-
ity is (not) likely to represent a signicant risk [5]. is is especially
relevant as recent empirical [1] as well as analytical [3] ndings
indicate that most vulnerabilities remain unexploited by aackers.
It is therefore especially important to devise measures that rule out
‘low-risk’ vulnerabilities to prioritize ne-grained assessments on
high-potential vulnerabilities.
In this paper we investigate whether the information reported in
the CVSS-vector may provide useful information, otherwise lost
in the aggregate score, to estimate the aack potential of a vulner-
ability. Leveraging on real aack data from Symantec, we show
the existence of a clear trade-o between exploitation complexity
and impact in terms of number of expected aacks observed in
the wild. We propose to leverage this trade-o to identify a new
measure, ‘Aack Potential’, that can be readily estimated from the
CVSS-vector and used as a measure of vulnerability prioritization
next to the standard CVSS-score metric (e.g. in a standard secu-
rity triage process [5]). Building on top of previous related work
[2], we show that patching policies based on our estimator show a
comparable or beer reduction in risk than current best practices
by requiring an essentially halved workload in terms of patched
vulnerabilities without losing ability of foiling aacks in the wild.
is paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces our
datasets. Section 3 gives a rst overview of exploits in Impact and
Complexity. In Section 4 we introduce the Aack Potential measure,
and in Section 5 we evaluate our estimator against real aacks in
the wild. Section 6 discusses threats to validity; related work is
presented in Section 7, and Section 8 concludes the paper.
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High Impact vulnerabilities are exploited several orders of magnitude more fre-
quently than low Impact vulnerabilities.
Figure 1: Trends of attacks by impact type. Y-axis is in loga-
rithmic scale
2 DATASETS
Our analysis is based on three datasets:
(1) e National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is usually consid-
ered the public universe of vulnerabilities held by NIST. Our NVD
samples reports 49599 vulnerabilities (CVE identiers).
(2) To approximate a collection of vulnerabilities used in the wild
we have used Symantec’s AackSignature1 and reatExplorer2
public data (SYM). It contains all entries identied as malware
(local threats) or remote aacks (network threats) by Symantec’s
commercial products. It reports 1277 vulnerabilities.
(3) Symantec’s WINE data sharing program [7] collects records
of aacks for aack signatures and CVEs reported in SYM. Our
WINE sample has been collected in Summer 2012 and reports 2M
aacks detected between August 2009 and June 2012 against 106
systems[7], and exploiting 408 vulnerabilities.
3 EXPLORATIVE ATTACK DATA ANALYSIS
CVSS classies vulnerability Impact over an assessment of the clas-
sic Condentiality, Integrity, Availability properties, expressed in
terms of (C)omplete, (P)artial, (N)one losses. Figure 1 reports the
trend in volumes of aacks per CIA impact type. Only CIA con-
gurations for which there is an entry in WINE are reported (the
interested reader can refer to [2] for a more detailed analysis of in-
cidence of impact types on vulnerabilities and exploits). e Y-axis
is in logarithmic scale. It is immediately evident that two levels
of prevalence of CIA impacts in aacks can be identied: vulner-
abilities with C,I,A assessment <C,C,C><P,P,P>,<N,N,P> are up
to 5 orders of magnitude more exploited than most other impact
types. <C,C,C> and <P,P,P> vulnerabilities are among the most
targeted; this matches the observation that these impact types are
among the most common overall in NVD [2]. On the other hand,
the high incidence of <N,N,P> vulnerabilities in WINE does not
1hp://www.symantec.com/security response/aacksignatures/
2hp://www.symantec.com/security response/threatexplorer/
Table 1: Relationship between Access Complexity, Impact
and presence of exploit.
Fraction of vulnerabilities exploited in the wild reported in SYMby Impact and
Access Complexity. Low-complexity vulnerabilities are the most frequent
ones. Medium-complexity vulnerabilities are only exploited when matched by a
High Impact. High-complexity vulnerabilities are seldom exploited. Fractions in
SYMare clearly dierent from those in NVD, indicating that the selection process
of vulnerability exploits is not random.
Acc. Complexity Impact SYM NVD
HIGH
HIGH 1.33% 0.92%
MEDIUM 1.88% 1.89%
LOW 1.02% 1.89%
MEDIUM
HIGH 32.50% 7.65%
MEDIUM 3.60% 7.69%
LOW 2.43% 14.83%
LOW
HIGH 18.09% 11.80%
MEDIUM 22.55% 30.43%
LOW 16.60% 22.90%
match a high presence of this impact type in NVD [2]. Further, it is
useful to observe that <N,N,P> vulnerabilities are more commonly
exploited in the wild than <N,N,C> vulnerabilities, despite a lower
overall impact (Partial Availability as opposed to Complete Avail-
ability impact). Some light can be shed on the apparent mismatch
between volume of aacks and relative impact of aected vulner-
abilities by considering the Access Complexity levels reported
in the NVD. We nd that 95% of aacked <N,N,P> vulnerabilities
have a Low CVSS Access Complexity, and that more than 50% of
<N,N,C> vulnerabilities are scored as High or Medium complexity.
is suggests that the combination of CVSS Impact and Access
Complexity assessments may provide a useful rst indicator of
presence of exploit in the wild.
Trends of aacks in Impact and Complexity. Following ocial
guidelines [11], we categorise vulnerabilities by their impact and
complexity over three levels for each metric: HIGH ,MEDIUM,LOW .
Vulnerability characteristics are identied in short by the tuple
<AC=X,I=Y>, withx andy the assessments for the Access Complexity
and Impact metrics respectively. Table 1 reports the relative frac-
tions of vulnerabilities in SYM for each combination. It is evident
that Low complexity and Medium complexity, High impact vul-
nerabilities are over-represented in SYM with respect to NVD. For
example, <AC=M, I=H> vulnerabilities constitute 32.5% of vulnera-
bilites in SYM, whereas they represent only 7.65% of vulnerabilities
in NVD. Similarly, <AC=M, I={M,L}> vulnerabilities are under-
represented in SYM with respect to occurrences in NVD.
In Figure 2 we report aack volumes in time aggregated by
{complexity, impact} types. e Y-axis is in logarithmic scale. In
the plot the <AC=M, I=L> tuple is not reported as many data points
in the time series are zeros. e great majority of exploited vul-
nerabilities are Low Access Complexity ones; among these, the
most aacked are High Impact vulnerabilities. Medium Access
Complexity vulnerabilities are massively exploited only if their im-
pact on the victim systems is High. e resulting picture is therefore
rather simple: the majority of exploits are for easy vulnerabilities
to exploit, regardless of their Impact type. Medium complexity
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Vulnerabilities with a high impact-complexity trade-o are exploited orders of
magnitude more oen than other vulnerabilities. Medium Acc. Complexity
vulnerabilities drive aacks only when matched by a high Impact.
Figure 2: Attacker trade-os in Impact vs Complexity types.
Y-axis is in logarithmic scale.
vulnerabilities are less targeted (by two orders of magnitude), and
only if the exploitation impact is High. Essentially we can see that
Low Complexity and High Impact vulnerabilities remain at large
the favorite vector for aacks while the remaining Low Complexity
or Medium Complexity but High Impact are still very popular albeit
by varying degrees (oscillating in 1 order of magnitude below the
top category). e other vulnerability types remain below at several
orders of magnitude. is suggests that the combination of Access
Complexity and Impact may help identifying useful measures for
incidence of aacks.
4 POTENTIAL OF ATTACK
To more precisely describe the trends outlined in Section 3 we
dene pA as an empirical measure of the potential of aack of a
vulnerability over a set of vulnerable machines.3 Our pA measure
is specied as
pA = loд10(Av ) (1)
where Av is the number of aacks observed in the wild for the
vulnerability v . A pA of 6 corresponds to one million aacks in the
wild in our sample (i.e. one per systems on average). A pA = 2
indicates 100 recorded aacks.4 Figure 3 reports the probability
density distribution of pA for vulnerabilities reported in WINE. e
x axis reports the pA values and the y axis the incidence of each pA.
pA ranges in [0..7.5]. Its distribution spikes at pA ≈ 1 and pA ≈ 6.
50% of vulnerabilities are below a pA of 1.6, and 75% below 3.4. is
means that 50% and 75% of vulnerabilities receive respectively up
to about 50 (101.6) and 2500 (103.4) aacks in the wild over the
observation period.
3In chemistry, the pH of a solution is a function of the (molar) concentration of
hydrogen ions. Similarly, in our denition of pA we consider the presence of aacks
in the wild recorded over the WINE sample.
4Obviously, over a set of 106 machines some may be aacked more than once and
some may not be aacked at all.
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Figure 3: Probability density of pAmeasures inWINE.
Table 2: Scores by Impact and Access Complexity type. Val-
ues derived from the original CVSS v2 formula [11].
Impact Score
H 10
M 6
L 3
Acc. Complexity Score
L 10
M 7
H 2
Estimation of vulnerability aack potential. We exploit the impact-
complexity eect described in Section 3 to estimate the volume of
aacks that a vulnerability can potentially receive if an aack for
it exists in the wild. Given the high incidence of unexploited vul-
nerabilities in the wild [12], a desirable property for our estimator
is to maintain high true negative rates (something that the bare
CVSS-score unfortunately does not do [2]), whereas false positives
can be ruled out by more ne-grained assessments later in a triage
process [5]. To build our estimator, we rst assign to each Impact
and Access Complexity value an ordinal value derived directly
from the original CVSS v2 specication [11]. Table 2 reports the as-
signed scores. Leveraging the logarithmic relation between aacks
in the wild and CVSS measures, we dene the estimated aack
potential E[pA] as:
E[pA] = loд10(Impact) × (Complexity) (2)
e estimator in Eq. 2 will return values of E[pA] ∈ [0, 10].
Because our WINE set is collected over 106 machines [7], we dene
the following discrete levels:
• 5 < E[pA]: HIGH
• 3 < E[pA] ≤ 5: MEDIUM
• 0 ≤ E[pA] ≤ 3: LOW
As an application example of our measure, Table 3 reports the pA
and E[pA] estimates for ten example vulnerabilities randomly sam-
pled from WINE. Table 4 reports overall results for the full WINE
dataset. e estimator performs generally well, with only 6% of the
assessments being under-estimations of real pA (i.e. false negatives).
Importantly, Table 4 shows that our estimator is a conservative one,
in that when it does not match the correct pA category, it over-
estimates it. It therefore does not lead to ignoring vulnerabilities
that should be treated. Among the false-negatives, 87% of the esti-
mation error is limited to one level only on the discrete scale. Note
that because all vulnerabilities considered in Table 4 have at least
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Table 3: E[pA] estimates for vulnerabilities in the WINE sample.
Calculation of E[pA] values for ten vulnerabilities in WINE. e estimator only need in input Access Complexity and Impact values from the CVSS-vector.
Vulnerability characteristics pA E[pA]
CVE Sw AC Impact #aacks pA Discrete pa E[pA] Discrete E[pA] E[pA] ≈ pA
CVE-2010-0806 internet explorer M H 126765 5.1 HIGH 7 HIGH 4
CVE-2009-3886 jre L M 427315 5.6 HIGH 8.4 HIGH 4
CVE-2009-0075 internet explorer M H 2803 3.4 MEDIUM 7 HIGH E[pA] > pA
CVE-2008-5359 jdk M H 377324 5.6 HIGH 7 HIGH 4
CVE-2008-0726 acrobat M H 246049 5.3 HIGH 7 HIGH 4
CVE-2007-0038 windows 2000 M H 2291 3.3 MEDIUM 7 HIGH E[pA] > pA
CVE-2007-0015 quicktime M M 147857 5.1 HIGH 5.9 HIGH 4
CVE-2005-4459 ace L H 4 0.6 LOW 10 HIGH E[pA] > pA
CVE-2003-0109 windows 2000 L M 203530 5.3 HIGH 8.4 HIGH 4
CVE-1999-0749 windows 95 H L 20 1.3 LOW 0.9 LOW 4
Table 4: E[pA] and pA discrete estimations.
Our pA estimator conservatively estimates real volumes of aacks in the wild,
and seldom under-estimates real pA values. A low E[pA] correctly matches a
low-pA vulnerability 67% of the time, whereas medium and high E[pA] levels
seem to consistently over-estimate low-pA vulnerabilities.
E[pA]
HIGH MEDIUM LOW Sum
pA
HIGH 70 13 3 86
MEDIUM 62 2 7 71
LOW 197 34 20 251
Sum 329 49 30 408
an exploit in the wild (as they are reported in WINE), the reported
indicators do not represent real-world performance of the estimator.
We give full a consideration of this in the next section.
5 AN APPLICATION TO ILLUSTRATIVE
PATCHING POLICIES
To illustrate the practical application of our estimator to vulnerabil-
ity management practices, we dene a patching policy as a process
that, given in input vulnerability data, outputs a Patch/NotPatch
decision. A patching policy denes a threshold above which the
Patch decision is triggered. We dene the following policies:
• All vulns: no risk factor is identied; under this policy
every vulnerability is patched.
• CVSS ≥ 4: patches all vulnerabilities to which is assigned a
CVSS score equal or higher than 4. is policy corresponds
to the PCI DSS recommendation for management of credit
card holders data [13].
• COMPL = L: patches ‘easy to exploit vulnerabilities’ with
a CVSS Complexity assessment = L.
• COMPL ≤ M : patches only ‘low hanging fruits’ vulnera-
bilities with a CVSS Complexity assessment either L or M .
High complexity vulnerabilities are ignored.
• E[pA] = H : accounts for vulnerabilities with a high esti-
mated pA (E[pA] > 5).
Table 5: Output format of our experiment.
v ∈ SYM v < SYM
Above reshold a b
Below reshold c d
5.1 Calculation of Risk Reduction
To evaluate the ecacy of the dierent patching policies, we com-
pute the frequency with which each policy identies a vulnerability
in SYM. To evaluate each risk policy we randomly sample a vulner-
ability from NVD with the same characteristics in terms of soware
and year of disclosure as in SYM [2, 6]. We then evaluate the count
of sampled vulnerabilities that the policy marks as ‘high risk’ (i.e.
above the threshold identied by the policy), and compare that to
the vulnerability’s actual presence in SYM.
e output of our experiment is represented in Table 5. e rst
row identies the vulnerabilities that need be treated according to
the decision variables. e risk entailed by selected vulnerabilities
is computed on the rst row, and is the ratio Rtr eated = a/(a + b).
e boom row identies the vulnerabilities that are not selected
for treatment (below the identied threshold). e risk associated
with the untreated vulnerabilities is the ratioRuntreated = c/(c+d).
e dierence between the two is dened in the literature as risk
reduction (RR) [8]. For a xed number of vulnerabilities to patch,
policies with a higher risk reduction identify a greater fraction of
exploited vulnerabilities than policies with a lower risk reduction.
Formally, let Attacked be the set of vulnerabilities for which
aacks in the wild have been reported and Selected the set of
vulnerabilities above a policy’s threshold. e risk of treated (un-
treated) vulnerabilities for a patching policy Rtr eated (Runtreated )
and the risk reduction (RR) of a policy are dened as:
Rtr eated =
|Attacked ∩ Selected |
|Selected | (3)
Runtreated =
|Attacked ∩ ¬Selected |
|¬Selected | (4)
RR = Rtr eated − Runtreated (5)
To implement the procedure we perform a bootstrapped case-
control study as described in [2]. Because dierent soware types
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Table 6: Risk reduction and vulnerabilities to be considered
per policy.
High risk reduction patching policies address a higher rate of exploited vulner-
abilities by decreasing the rate of false positives. A policy based on our E[pA]
measure outperforms standard patching policies based on the sole CVSS-score or
atomic values of the CVSS-vector.
Policy #V RR C.I.
All vulns 14.380 - -
CV SS ≥ 4 13715 23.2% 21.2% - 24.5%
Comp = L 7552 13.0% 11.9% - 14.1%
Comp ≤ M 13952 5.2% 2.6% - 6.3%
E[pA] = H 8308 26.8% 24.5% - 27.4%
may lead to dierent aack frequencies, we identify four soware
categories in SYM to control for in our sample [4, 6]: IE, PLUGIN,
PROD and WINDOWS. e classication is performed by manually
assigning soware names to a category and then using regular
expressions to match each CVE to the respective category.
5.2 Risk reduction in the wild
With this formulation we can compare the policies identied in
Section 5. Table 6 reports the results of the analysis. e rst row
reports the results for the All vulns policy. With reference to our
NVD dataset sample, this would require analyzing more than 14
thousand vulnerabilities5. Risk Reduction can not be computed
for this policy as no vulnerability remains unselected for patching.
Among all policies, Comp = L and Comp ≤ M achieve the lowest
risk reductions. is example is however useful in beer illustrating
the mechanism implemented by the RR metric. WhereasComp = L
is a subset of Comp ≤ M , its risk-reduction is signicantly higher;
this may result counter-intuitive as the laer contains all vulner-
abilities included in the former. However, note that by including
additional vulnerabilities that are not aacked, Comp ≤ M de-
creases Rtr eated , thus resulting in a lower overall RR. A high RR
results therefore from policies that well balance the risk of selected
vulnerabilities with the ‘residual’ risk that characterizes unselected
vulnerabilities. e largest risk reduction is achieved by the policy
based on the impact-complexity trade-o (RR = 26.8%). e second
largest RR is achieved by a policy based on PCI-DSS. e former re-
quires to analyze 8.3 thousand vulnerabilities and the laer almost
14 thousand. From this perspective the policy E[pA] = H seems to
have the best trade-o: lowest number of vulnerabilities and best
risk reduction.
Table 7 reports the risk reduction for the aggregate case and the
experiment for the controls. Comparisons are by row. As we can
see from the table, the relative ordering is essentially preserved
for all control factors. With few exceptions, the preferred global
policy remains the preferred one even when restricted to a specic
soware category. WINDOWS vulnerabilities are here an exception,
showing that the trade-o may not be a good proxy for this soware
5e implementation of these policies may require dierent levels of eort or costs.
For example, the same vulnerability could be present in hundreds of machines or could
reside in a server for which a 1 hour downtime is already too much. is information
is company dependent and we do not consider it here. Rather, we consider a simpler
proxy information that is the number of vulnerabilities that are marked for patching
by each policy.
category and that other variables should be considered. IE shows
mixed behavior with E[pA] = H performing similarly toCVSS ≥ 4,
but worse than Comp = L in terms of RR. A negative RR indicates
that the residual risk in the ‘untreated’ vulnerabilities is higher than
the risk for the treated vulnerabilities.
5.3 pA reduction in the wild
We now look at the the ecacy of each policy in reducing aacks in
the wild. Table 8 reports, for each control, the amount of patching
work required relative to the total for that soware category and
the reduction in pA. By looking at the pA and %V columns, it
is possible to see that the E[pA] = H patching policy achieves
the lowest workload (requiring to patch only 58% of the original
volume of vulnerabilities), and still fully addresses pA in the wild
throughout all soware categories6.
Further, the results reported in Table 8 can be used to validate
the risk reduction measure introduced in [2]. For RR to be a valid
measure for patching policy eectiveness, there should be a corre-
spondence between the level of RR and the policy’s eectiveness in
the wild. In Table 6 the ‘PCI DSS’ policy (patch all vulnerabilities
with CVSS ≥ 4) and E[pA] = H have the highest risk reductions
(23% and 26% respectively). Compl = L and Comp ≤ M showed
a much lower RR, the laer being the worst. We nd this same
ordering to be preserved in the evaluation in the wild reported in
Table 8. E[pA] = H represents the best trade-o between workload
and reduction in pA, while Comp = L entails the lowest workload
but at the price of a lower reduction in pA. Similar considerations
can be done if we break down the analysis for the controls.
6 THREATS TO VALIDITY
External validity. WINE data is a representative sample of aacks
detected in the wild against ‘user machines’. Our conclusions are
therefore limited to systems of the same nature: dierent dynamics
may hold for server machines or specialized systems. Internal
validity. Volumes of aacks against vulnerabilities may change by
geographical area. It is possible that some vulnerabilities aacked
only in particular areas or aecting only particular systems of
lower commercial interest for Symantec may not appear or are
under-represented in our datasets. To address this, in our case-
control study we control for possible factors for inclusion in SYM
[2]. Further renements may be needed to safely narrow the scope
of our conclusions down to specic user populations.
7 RELATEDWORK
An analysis of the distribution of CVSS scores and subscores has
been presented by Scarfone et al. in [15]. Frei et al.’s [9] studied the
life-cycle of a vulnerability from exploit to patch. eir dataset is
a composition of NVD, OSVDB and ‘FVDB’ (Frei’s Vulnerability
DataBase, obtained from the examination of security advisories for
patches). e notion of vulnerability risk has been considered in
[2], where the authors show that the CVSS score as an aggregate
number is not a satisfactory risk metric for vulnerabilities. Holm
et al. [10] investigated through expert opinion which aspects of
a vulnerability should be considered on top of the baseline CVSS
6No value is reported in Table 8 for Comp = L under the IE category because there
are no aacks of this type in this category.
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Table 7: Risk reduction and workload, expressed in terms of no. vulnerabilities patched, for all controls.
Risk reduction and patching workload expressed in number of vulnerabilities to x identied in NVD. e ordering of the risk reduction measure is essentially
preserved over all soware categories with the exception of WINDOWS, for which additional considerations apart from the technical characteristics of the
vulnerability may need to be considered.
Aggregate IE PLUGIN WINDOWS PROD
Policy RR #V RR #V RR #V RR #V RR #V
All vulns - 14380 - 1223 - 588 - 490 - 895
CV SS ≥ 4 23.2% 13715 -24.4% 1208 50.5% 577 3.4% 477 23.1% 867
Comp = L 13% 7552 7.9% 635 5.2% 230 -5.4% 236 11.4% 186
Comp ≤ M 5.2% 13952 -37.4% 1197 36.4% 561 -23.0% 472 -15.5% 878
E[pA] = H 26.8% 8308 -28.2% 733 52.2% 449 -52.4% 389 21.3% 739
Table 8: Workload and pA reduction for all controls.
e policy based on the E[pA] measure drastically decreases the fraction of vulnerabilities to consider for patching while foiling the vast majority of aacks in the
wild (6.7 pA points against an overall pA of 6.8).
Aggregate IE PLUGIN WINDOWS PROD
Policy %V pA %V pA %V pA %V pA %V pA
All vulns 100.0% 6.8 100.0% 5 100.00% 6.7 100.0% 6.1 100.0% 4.4
CV SS ≥ 4 95.4% 6.8 98.8% 5 98.13% 6.7 97.3% 6.1 96.9% 4.4
Comp = L 52.5% 6.3 51.9% - 39.12% 6.3 48.2% 5 20.8% 3.3
Comp ≤ M 97.0% 6.8 97.9% 5 95.41% 6.7 96.3% 6.1 98.1% 4.4
E[pA] = H 57.8% 6.7 59.9% 5 76.36% 6.6 79.4% 6.1 82.6% 4.4
assessment to beer represent risk of exploit. e present work
extends this line of research by showing that the inner assessments
in the CVSS framework can be instrumental for vulnerability pri-
oritisation. Other work focused on the volume of aacks in the
wild recorded against vulnerabilities. Allodi showed in [1] that
vulnerability exploitation follows a heavy-tailed distribution, and
that for some soware types as lile as 5% of aacked vulnera-
bilities represent 95% of the risk in the wild. Similarly, Nayak et
al. [12] showed that aackers prefer certain vulnerabilities over
others. Our work integrates these results by showing that part of
the aacker’s decision process is inuenced by a trade-o between
the complexity and the impact of the vulnerability exploit.
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we investigated trends in vulnerability aacks per
CVSS Impact and Exploitability types. We nd that there exists a
clear-cut distinction in terms of aacks in the wild between low
complexity, high impact vulnerabilities and high complexity, low
impact vulnerabilities.
Leveraging this eect we build an estimator of the Aack Poten-
tial of a vulnerability that provides a rst indicator of the risk of
exploitation in the wild. e estimator presented in this work is
straightforward to implement and can be used in foresight with-
out pre-existing data on the volume of aacks in the wild for that
vulnerability. We test our estimator against standard CVSS-based
patching policies and show that it outperforms them in terms of
foiled aacks and entailed workload. e Aack Complexity metric
in the 3.0 release of CVSS reects these observations.
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